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Note to Schmoozers:  This is a draft of a paper that Des King and I are doing for a French 
journal’s special issue on the Shelby County decision.  It is written for a European 
audience so includes material superfluous for this audience.  But haven’t had time to 
produce an appropriately abridged version for you – sorry!  Hope it’s not too much 
trouble to skip over all that is very, very familiar. 
Rogers Smith 
 
 
The Last Stand: 
Restricting Voting Rights and Sustaining White Power in Modern America 
Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith 
 
Abstract:  The Supreme Court’s Shelby County v. Holder ruling invalidating Section 4(b) 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 should be understood as in part a product of efforts to 
resist further transformations in traditional American institutional arrangements that 
have conferred advantages on whites, especially disproportionate political power.  
Those efforts are not likely to succeed in the long run, but they may embroil American 
elections and American governance in paralyzing conflicts for years to come. 
 
 
1. Voting Rights and America’s racial policy alliances.   
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Shelby County v. Holder finding Section 4(b) of 
the Voting Rights Act (VRA)1 unconstitutional is the most transformative of the 
important opinions issued in the final week of the Court’s 2012-13 term.2 The decision 
attacks the core of the VRA. It threatens to end the most interventionist egalitarian 
power given to the federal government in the twentieth century: the requirement of 
federal pre-clearance of changes in voting rules in certain jurisdictions. Under the VRA’s 
Section 5, a number of states identified by the formula in 4(b) as having operated voting 
systems with inappropriate barriers to full and equal participation are required to 
obtain permission from the U.S. Department of Justice or a federal court before making 
any changes to state or local laws which impact voting.  The obliteration of Section 4(b) 
                                                           
1 Voting Rights Act of 1965 Public Law 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. As Amended Through PL 
110-258, Enacted July 1, 2008. 
2 Shelby County v. Holder, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-
96_6k47.pdf 
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powers marks a critical battle site in the struggle between those favoring and those 
opposing amelioration of material racial inequality in the US, furthering since it signals 
the ascendancy t of the latter. 
The Court ruled that the formula used in Section 4(b) to determine if states or local 
governments violate the VRA—whether less than 50% of persons of voting age were 
registered to vote in 1964, or whether less than 50% actually voted in the 1964 
presidential election--is no longer valid. There are, indeed, reasons to fault Congress for 
not updating the formula in the last half century.3  But simply finding Section 4(b) 
unconstitutional renders the VRA’s Section 5 preclearance powers toothless. The 
majority justices must have known that pressing Congress to amend the law would 
probably cripple the VRA.  Although at this writing, Wisconsin Republican Jim 
Sensenbrenner in the House and Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy in the Senate are 
promoting a bill that would restore preclearance requirements for states and cities that 
have histories of voting rights violations in the last 15 years, it is improbable that the 
House, heavily influenced by a conservative Republican faction, will even vote on it.4 
The end of pre-clearance approval for changes to voting rules or procedures in the 
currently covered states means that any arguably discriminatory changes, including 
new voter ID laws, restrictions on early voting times, or redistricting, can only be legally 
challenged retrospectively, after an election has occurred under these new procedures. 
This shift to after-the-fact litigation is a sharp reversal in the legal resources available to 
minority voters prior to an election, a weakening of anti-discrimination law, and 
succour to recently revivified voter suppression activists (Piven,  Minnite and Groarke 
2009, 164-203).5 
These realities are widely recognized.  Less obviously but just as importantly, this 
abolition of pre-clearance approval should be seen as, among other things,  a triumph 
for what we call the “color blind racial policy alliance” in American politics (King and 
Smith 2011, 9-10). The ruling also affirms that the U.S. Supreme Court is the most 
aggressive government institution in this alliance today.   
We have argued that American racial politics has historically been structured by 
opposed policy alliances (or “racial orders”) that include movement activists, political 
parties, and governing institutions, held together by views on how to resolve the central 
racial policy issue of their eras—first slavery, then de jure segregation, and in the 
                                                           
3 For a view that Congress ignored hard questions about the VRA’s retained criteria for 
determining preclearance view, see Pildes (2006).  He advocates a national uniform 
standard policy rather than the pre-existing covered jurisdictions framework. 
4 The Editorial Board, “A Step Toward Restoring Voting Rights,” New York Times, 
January 18, 2014, SR10. 
5 Piven, Minnete and Groarke provide a comprehensive typology of the current methods 
of vote suppression, or what they call “keeping the voters down,” including 
misinformation campaigns, “caging” and challenging voters, and manipulation of 
registration records and lists (2009, 167-186). 
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modern day, whether racial equality is best realized by insisting that public policies 
eschew racial categories, the view of the color blind policy alliance, or by consciously 
constructing measures to reduce material racial inequalities, the view of the rival “race 
conscious” policy alliance.  The bulk of the American public favors color blind policies, 
but most Americans also oppose any measures that appear to retreat from the 
accomplishments of the 1960s civil rights era (King and Smith 2011, 285-286).  As a 
result, elected officials of both parties often prefer to leave controversial racial 
questions to less visible administrative agencies or the politically insulated courts than 
to engage with them in election campaigns.6  And the fact that the nation has had a 
preponderance of Republican Presidents since 1968 means that the Supreme Court has 
had in the post-1960s decades a majority that has increasingly moved toward rigid 
insistence on color blind views of constitutional equality (King and Smith 2011, 130-
131, 291-292).    
As the efforts of some moderate Republicans to show themselves champions of minority 
voting rights indicates, although many conservative political leaders have objected to 
the Voting Rights Act throughout its history, its popularity means that probably only the 
Supreme Court could have openly sought to limit its reach.  Enacted by Congress 
initially to be a temporary measure, the VRA soon proved the most successful act of the 
civil rights era, in both policy and political terms.  It has enfranchised millions of largely 
non-white voters and promoted non-white office holding, vindicating America’s claims 
to be a democracy in the eyes of all Americans.   As a result, Congress has repeatedly 
renewed the VRA with overwhelming bipartisan approval in final roll call votes—
though conservatives consistently sought to weaken the law at earlier stages in 
legislative renewal processes (King and Smith 2011, 170-179).   
Color blind advocates have been the most outspoken critics of the modern VRA, 
contending it has been turned into a vehicle for race conscious policymaking, which 
they view as immoral and unconstitutional.  They and conservatives more broadly have 
also correctly seen the law as aiding the voting power of supporters of liberal policies 
across a range of issues.   The VRA’s 1975 amendments extended its protections to 
many Latinos by adding language-based triggers for federal monitoring and pre-
clearance requirements, and in 1982, further amendments authorized the creation of 
minority majority districts as solutions to proven patterns of discrimination, overriding 
contrary judicial rulings (King and Smith 2011, 174-176).  In partisan terms, the non-
                                                           
6 AnFor a valuable illustration of this electoral silence is see the discussion of the non-
discussion of segregation in the last Chicago mayoral election campaign: Steve Bogira 
“Separate, Unequal and Ignored: Racial segregation remains Chicago’s most 
fundamental problem. Why isn’t it an issue in the mayor’s race?” Chicago Reader 
February 10, 2011; accessed at:  http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicago-
politics-segregation-african-american-black-white-hispanic-latino-population-census-
community/Content?oid=3221712 
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white voters the VRA helped secure the right to register and to vote have 
overwhelmingly favored Democrats in the 21st century.  In 2013, for example, while 
Romney carried the 72% of the electorate that identified as white by 59%-39%, Obama 
carried the 13% of the electorate who identified as African American 93% to 6%; the 
10% of the electorate who classified as Latinos, 71% to 27%; and the 3% of the 
electorate who were Asian American, 73% to 26% (CNN 2012).   And in regard to 
policies, non-white voters remain far more favorable to race conscious measures and 
many other liberal positions than most whites (King and Smith 2011, 98, 127, 257; 
Ethnic Majority 2012).  Consequently, Republicans, particularly the great bulk of 
Republicans who now identify as conservatives, have had strong reasons to discourage 
instead of encourage voting by these groups, thereby maintaining a disproportionate 
predominance of whites in America’s active electorate.   
For years, Republican legislators have aggressively sought to enact new barriers to 
likely Democratic and non-white voters, and those efforts accelerated in the wake of the 
Shelby v. Holder decision.  Since the Court ruling, of states covered by the 4(b) formula, 
eight have moved to adopt new voter ID laws or other voter validation checks or to 
implement their recent voter ID laws, including Texas which previously had its law 
rejected by the Justice Department when it sought pre-clearance.  Six states not covered 
by 4(b) have adopted similar measures.7  These efforts have prompted VRA Section 2 
lawsuits, used to challenge voting qualifications, practices and procedures that deny or 
abridge voting rights on account of race or color, against the state governments. The 
Justice Department is suing North Carolina to challenge four provisions in the state’s 
new voting law, including one which requires photo identification, and to seek a 
reinstatement of pre-clearance obligation on the state; and it is challenging Texas’s 
photo ID requirements and its redistricting plans.8  
President Obama described the Court’s decision as “deeply disappointing,” and groups 
representing minority voters such as the NAACP and the NAACP LDF condemned the 
decision as unjustified because of continuing problems of voter discrimination – a 
realityproblem the majority justices acknowledged.  But supporters of the Court’s 
decision - conservative legislators, proponents of states’ rights, champions of tighter 
voter restrictions, and critics of the efficacy and justice of public policy interventions 
that seek to promote material equality – argue that the empirical evidence about recent 
voting turnout for minority compared with white voters means the need for VRA 
preclearance in the jurisdictions covered in 1964 has evaporated.  Few contemporary 
American political battles are seen as having higher stakes.  
(a) The racial alliances framework. 
                                                           
7 “Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting Rights Act,” 
http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map. 
8 Ibid. and “Justice Dept Poised to File Lawsuit Over Voter ID Law,” New York Times 30 
September 2013. 
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In large part because European-descended Americans acquired land in North America 
through extensive forcible displacement of indigenous tribes, and their newly 
independent United States then built its economy through substantial reliance on the 
plantation labor of African slaves, from early on in their history Americans elaborated 
ideologies and laws privileging those labelled “whites” over most non-whites and 
particularly those labelled “black” (though just where these racial lines were drawn was 
always contested and often shifted).  The elaboration of “white supremacy” defences of 
Native American removal, the Mexican American War, and above all chattel slavery 
created deep material and psychological investments in racially inegalitarian 
institutions and practices for many whites, but many Americans of all races also always 
condemned slavery as morally wrong, economically inefficient, and politically 
corrupting.  Yet even after the nation ended slavery at the fearsome price of a massive 
civil war, commitments to white supremacy remained so powerful that their 
proponents eventually succeeded in defeating racially egalitarian Reconstruction 
programs and creating a new white supremacist racial order, the Jim Crow segregation 
system, that prevailed in American life and U.S. politics from the 1880s to the 1960s.9   
It is vital to bear this familiar history in mind to understand current controversies--for 
the reality is that the political, economic, and social systems advantaging whites built up 
during that long history have persisted in many forms despite Americans’ formal 
repudiation of legalized white supremacy.   
The Voting Rights Act, along with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, constituted the core of that 
formal repudiation, but they only began processes of building institutions and practices 
that would be genuinely racially inclusive and egalitarian in fact.   Controversies over 
how far and in what ways to pursue those goals in many arenas still divide Americans 
today and no disputes are more crucial than voting rights.  Though most white 
Americans no longer believe their nation should be one that explicitly gives special de 
jure privileges to whites, many appearare made anxious by the prospect that whites 
might soon no longer have anything approaching the disproportionate political power 
and economic status they have enjoyed throughout U.S. history (King and Smith 2011, 
168-191, 253-284). 
Indeed, white Americans accepted repudiation of their de jure privileges in the 1960s 
only under extraordinary circumstances, including the heightening of many decades of 
protesting, marching, organizing and litigating by what became known as the civil rights 
movement; the pressures of the Cold War; the shocking assassination of President John 
F. Kennedy in Texas soon after he proposed what became the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and 
the consequent rise to the heights of power of a man determined to be a towering figure 
                                                           
9 For a classic overview of these developments, see John Hope Franklin and Evelyn 
Brooks Higginbotham, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, 9th ed. 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2010).  For an analysis of the factors driving racial change, see 
Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of 
Racial Equality in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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in the history of American democracy (Morris 1984; Packard 2002).  The Voting Rights 
Act was enacted by Congress in 1965 after an exceptional exercise of presidential 
persuasion by that man, President Lyndon B. Johnson, a reformed segregationist 
southern Democrat who had won a landslide election after Kennedy’s death and then 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in the previous year. Together the VRA and the CRA 
extended equal rights of citizenship to African Americans and other discriminated 
against minorities, restoring the unfulfilled promise of the post-Civil War amendments 
and civil rights statutes.  As we show in our book Still A House Divided, these momentous 
legislative changes spurred further battles in racial policy and politics from the 1960s.  
At first these struggles prompted discussions of a range of policy instruments about 
how best to address racial inequality (Ackerman 2014), but within the space of a decade 
this range had collapsed and coalesced into two mutually exclusive approaches.  
First is the color blind policy alliance whose members vigorously oppose government 
action to reduce the many persisting racial inequalities that advantage whites, 
especially if those actions come in the form of direct, race-targeted measures—though 
many color blind advocates condemn all race conscious policy making as equally 
immoral, whether or not explicit racial classifications are used.  They have mobilized 
against affirmative action and integration initiatives in education and employment 
(including seeking to truncate the impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and pursuing Supreme Court cases which in piecemeal fashion have 
banned or discouraged minority set-aside and federal contract compliance programs, 
and school district powers to foster racially integrated schools); they have opposed 
efforts to promote integrated affordable housing and environmental justices efforts 
focused on minority communities; and they campaigned first to prevent the VRA being 
made permanent and, once made permanent, then to water down the voting law’s 
efficacy. This color blind racial policy alliance has gained great acceptance amongst 
white voters, as measured by voting and in public opinion attitudes, and it continues to 
shape white voter opinion on a wide range of issues.  One scholar shows, for example, 
how this racial policy outlook amongst white voters strongly influenced attitudes 
toward the Affordable Health Care Act (Tesler 2012, 2013).  The influence of color-blind 
stances converges more generally with a rightward shift amongst many, though not all 
voters that has heightened America’s sharp polarization. Partly as a result, one political 
scientist finds that overall the U.S. voting population in 2012 expressed conservative 
attitudes to an extent not recorded since 1952 (Stimson 2013).  There is little doubt that 
many, probably most, of these American voters, conservative activists, and color blind 
proponents do not consciously favor white supremacy.  But there is also little doubt that 
most think it unwise and unjust for public policies to seek aggressively to transform 
further the political, economic, and social institutions and practices built up under 
centuries of white supremacist policies--institutions and practices in which whites 
continue to hold advantaged places, in practice if not in law.     
Opposing these proponents of color blindness is the race conscious policy alliance, 
which champions positive, sometimes explicitly race-targeted policy instruments to 
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address racial inequalities, including voting discrimination. The race conscious policy 
alliance programs – such as affirmative action (focused both on legacies of the Jim Crow 
era and more recent barriers to equality), anti-discrimination in housing, multicultural 
education initiatives, expanded EEOC regulatory powers in labor markets to counter 
discrimination, criminal justice reforms aimed at ending the disproportionate 
incarceration of non-whites, and more – have all been under multiple political 
challenges since the 1970s, with declining congressional and judicial support even after 
the election of America’s first African American president.  But for many decades most 
opponents of race-conscious policies chose to identify with, rather than to oppose 
openly, the now widely admired major civil rights laws of the 1960s.  Consequently, it 
has generally proven possible for race conscious proponents to sustain and sometimes 
to extend those original measures over muted color blind opposition.  
One success came in 2006, when the VRA was renewed after Congress spent 10 months 
reviewing the act, holding 21 hearings attended by over 90 witnesses and examining 
over 15,000 pages of evidence in addition to looking at the voting patterns in and 
outside the 16 Section 5 covered jurisdictions. These deliberations welcomed post 1965 
advances but concluded that entrenched voting discrimination in the areas singled out 
by the 4(b) formula endured.10    
In economic arenas, race conscious alliance supporters point to the documented erosion 
of effective regulatory agency efforts to root out labor market discrimination to argue 
that efforts to aid racial minorities continue to be needed (de Burca 2012).   
Advocates of race conscious reform policiesThey insist that whether or not the 
proponents of color blind measures explicitly desire to maintain white privileges, 
adoption of their stance inevitably means failure to pursue race conscious reform 
policies aggressively means that many longstanding forms of white advantage will 
persist for at least the near to middle term future.  One of those advantages is the 
disproportionate electoral political power of whites, the specific racial inequality that 
the Voting Rights Act sought to end. 
(b) The Shelby decision. 
In the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court, the VRA has succeeded so well that its 
most significant original provisions have become obsolete.  Shelby County v. Holder 
fundamentally undercuts the federal government’s powers to intervene in state and 
local cases of voting discrimination. To be sure, the decision leaves intact the VRA’s 
Section 3 powers.  These powers enable the Justice Department to bring states, cities, 
and other political subdivisions under its 15th Amendment voting rights jurisdiction.  
But to do so, the federal government must demonstrate that state legislators or the 
public officeholders responsible for compiling and monitoring electoral rolls’ accuracy 
                                                           
10 Congressman John Lewis “Why we still need the Voting Rights Act,” Washington Post, 
February 25 2013. 
  
 
P
ag
e8
 
or other aspects of electoral systems have intentionally engaged in racial 
discrimination. This criterion of discriminatory intent is notoriously slippery, and one 
major reason why the VRA’s Section 4(b) formula was enacted in the first place.  It 
enabled the Justice Department to act if a political subdivision was simply failing to 
register or turn out half its voters.   
The choice between including the need to demonstrate intentional racial discrimination 
versus showing a pattern of disparate impact on parts of the citizenry is a general one in 
all civil rights enforcement strategies.  Opting for the former always means opting for 
the weaker measure. 
The majority of the Shelby justices concluded that the low registration rates and voting 
tests that plagued southern states in the 1960s have gone, and that the gap between 
white and black registration and voting rates in the covered areas is no longer 
significant (and in some cases even favors blacks).   They cited white-black voting gaps 
of, for example, 49.9 per cent in Alabama and 63.2 in Mississippi in 1965, compared 
with 2004 gaps of 0.9 per cent in Alabama and -3.8 per cent in Mississippi (p15).  
Impressive and important as that progress in increasing black voter turnout is, both the 
oral hearing for Shelby and the judgment demonstrate how the five majority justices 
construed their decision about VRA in Shelby as a means to advance the color blind 
agenda of ending race conscious assistance measures.  After listening to the Justice 
Department defence of the VRA, Justice Antonio Scalia suggested that members of the 
US Senate who supported the Section 5 preclearance provisions did so for political 
reasons only, contending that such elected officials feared being criticized for opposing 
it.  Note that the 4(b) formula was clearly race conscious, concerned with obstacles to 
minority voters, but it was not explicitly race targeted.  It focused only on percentage of 
registered and actual voters, not the race of voters per se.  Nonetheless Scalia still 
excoriated congressional renewal of the VRA as being part of a “phenomenon that is 
called perpetuation of racial entitlement.”11  
Scalia’s characterization expresses one of the two beliefs underlying the Court’s 
majority opinion: the notion that because preclearance no longer seems required to 
protect voters against discrimination, it operates instead as an unjust legal privilege for 
non-white southern voters and so amounts to racism in a new form. The other element 
is the belief that the old form, white racism, is no longer sufficiently entrenched in the 
covered jurisdictions to warrant an interventionist preclearance power, even though 
the justices conceded that some discrimination continues (“voting discrimination still 
exists.”12 p2).   Outside the Court’s deliberations, color blind proponent and Republican 
Senator Rand Paul went further, contending that in fact no “objective evidence” of 
                                                           
11 Reported in Robert Barnes “Supreme Court conservatives express scepticism over 
voting law provision,” Washington Post February 27 2013. 
12 Shelby v. Holder at 2. 
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voting discrimination against African Americans exists today in the covered states, 
much less in America as a whole.13  
Although we believe enough has changed to make a strong case that Section 4(b)’s 
formula needs to be updated, it is at best naïve to think that high voting rates by 
themselves equate with an absence of discrimination.  Since the passage of the VRA, 
many of the covered jurisdictions (and others) have exhibited repeated efforts to 
establish new districting or at-large voting systems that would reduce chances for 
minority voters to elect a proportionate number of officeholders, even when they turn 
out in significant numbers.  These efforts often appear   The Justice Department has 
often scrutinized and rejected such changes in voting systems in these areas, deciding 
they were in fact aimed at just such vote dilution.  IAnd in Texas, for example, a three 
judge federal court found in 2012 that the Republican-controlled legislature’s proposed 
redistricting plan would discriminate against African American and other minority 
voters.  The judges also concluded that the plan’s designers intended this outcome. They 
observed that the lawyers challenging the districting scheme had provided more 
“evidence of discriminatory intent than we have space, or need, to address here.”14   
Again, it is far more effective to protect minority voting rights through preclearance 
rejection of such schemes than it is to sue after the elections in which they have been 
employed.  Contrary to Senator Paul and the Court’s majority, the need for such 
preclearance remains substantial, because there is abundant evidence of continuing 
discriminatory initiatives of these sorts. Between 2006 when the VRA was last 
reauthorized and 2012, 31 proposed changes to elections fell foul of the Justice 
Department’s approval, and in the period 1999 to 2005, 153 proposed changes were 
dropped after questions were raised about them by the Department of Justice.15  Shelby 
County itself had pursued redistricting plans that the Justice Department assessed as 
limiting the influence of black voters, precipitating the County’s legal attack on VRA 
preclearance requirements.   
This record animated Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s stern dissent into Shelby County and 
her assessment that “the scourge of discrimination has not yet extirpated.” Ginsburg 
reported: “all told, between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting 
                                                           
13 See news report of his August 2013 speech:  http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/08/15/rand-
paul-no-objective-evidence-of-racial-discrimination-in-elections/; Aaron Blake “Rand 
Paul: No ‘objective evidence’ African Americans are prevented from voting,” Washington 
Post  August 14, 2013. 
14 US District Court for the District of Columbia, State of Texas v. USA & Eric Holder, Civil 
Action No 11-1303. 
15  Myrna Perez and Vishal Agraharkar, If Section 5 Fails: New Voting Implications.   
Brennan Center for Justice, NYU Law School, p2. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/147170166/If-Section-5-Falls-New-Voting-Implications, 
2.  
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changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory.”16 In a highly 
detailed opiniondissent, Ginsburg cited Congress’s 2006 decision to reauthorize 
because of the VRA’s continuing efficacy as an instrument against discrimination against 
non-white voters in many parts of the country, including the covered regions, and she 
contended: 
“But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to block that 
discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has worked to combat voting 
discrimination where other remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is 
the VRA’s requirement of federal preclearance for all changes to voting laws in the 
regions of the country with the most aggravated records of rank discrimination against 
minority voting rights.”17   
The dissenting opinion ended with a pointed metaphor, as Ginsburg concluded that 
“throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop 
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you 
are not getting wet.”18 
In sum, the majority Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, striking down an effective 
and prestigious law, affirms that the politically insulated and largely Republican-
appointed Supreme Court is now the most aggressive member of the modern racial 
political alliance favoring color blindness. The opinion sits with and complements the 
Court’s steadfast erosion of affirmative action, set asides, school integration programs, 
and federal contract compliance measures since the early 1980s.  
2.  The color blind policy alliance’s upward march. 
Shelby County v. Holder was not, however, simply just anotherone more important 
victorydecision delivered by the Court to the modern color blind policy alliance.  It was 
a major advance on what is perhaps the central battleground upon which the two 
modern racial policy alliances have been battling for nearly three decades: the 
structuring of access to electoral power (Piven, Minnete and Graoake 2009: 1-6).   
Of course, the pertinent history could be extended much further back.  It is a 
commonplace in political struggles for political forces to seek to disfranchise or dilute 
the voting power of their opponents.  Disfranchisement through a great variety of 
mechanisms was a cornerstone of the subjugation of black Americans during the Jim 
Crow era (Tuck 2009; Valelly 2005).  And as the two parties have become identified 
with the rival modern racial policy alliances (a reality manifested in the party line 
division between the 5 Republican-nominated majority versus the 4 Democratic-
nominated dissenting justices in Shelby), the modern GOP began to pursue a variety of 
                                                           
16 Shelby County v. Holder, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan et al dissenting,  p13. 
17 Shelby County v. Holder, Ginsburg et al., Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting,  , 
pp1,2 . 
18 Shelby County v. Holder, ibid.,  Ibid p33. 
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means of minimizing voting by likely Democrats, often poorer non-white voters., with a 
variety of means. 
That pattern began when, twelve years into the “Reagan Revolution,” the Democrats 
briefly gained control of both houses of Congress as well as the White House after the 
1992 elections.  They quickly passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 
designed to achieve near-universal registration of eligible voters, in part by allowing 
persons to register as they applied for driver licenses or various social services (hence 
its nickname, the “Motor Voter” law).  Republicans attacked the bill as an 
unconstitutional infringement on state powers to define voter qualifications and as 
likely to unleash voter fraud (Minnite 2010, 136).  Once the bill, which did not go into 
effect until 1995, began to add millions of disproportionately less affluent and 
disproportionately minority voters to the rolls, Republicans and conservative advocacy 
groups and pundits began to stress more and more vociferously that voter fraud was a 
serious national problem; but no evidence of fraud was ever found convincing by the 
courts that considered challenges to the law (Minnite 2010, 136-139). 
In the same years Republicans, who had by and large championed immigrant workers 
and courted Latino voters in the Reagan years, found a new issue in public anxieties 
stirred by the rising number of unauthorized, primarily Mexican and Central American 
immigrants in the wake of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the 
1990 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Zolberg 2006, 403-423; King 
and Smith 2011, 241-245).  At both the state and national levels, Republicans enacted 
measures restricting the rights of documented and undocumented immigrants during 
the 1990s.  But ironically, these measures accelerated naturalization rates for legal 
Latino immigrants.  They also and heightened their already strong tendencies of new 
Latino citizens to vote Democratic (Zolberg 2006, 409, 424).  Consequently, Republicans 
became still more concerned that the fast-growing non-white segment of the American 
electorate posed a rising threat to their electoral prospects, especially in immigrant-
receiving states, which new, more diffuse immigration patterns were making far more 
numerous. 
Then in 2000, the Bush-Gore election debacle dramatized the many other inadequacies 
of America’s decentralized, partisan-operated system of conducting elections.  In 
response, Congress passed the 2002 “Help America Vote Act” (HAVA), in part to address 
the voting problems exposed in 2000 in Florida—but Republicans also included in the 
act a requirement that states collect official identifying information from citizens when 
they registered to vote, measures already in place in Florida (Minnite 2010, 134-135).  
From that point on, GOP state legislators began pushing for more and more demanding 
Voter ID requirements, all in the name of combating vote fraud.  They gave new 
emphasis, bolstered in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, to the danger of voting by 
illegal immigrants who supposedly could register when applying for a driver’s licenses, 
despite their lack of citizenship.  These arguments were still advanced without any 
concrete evidence that any such fraud was occurring (Minnite 2010, 8-14).  But 
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thesesuch claims formed a piece with mounting Republican-led state and local efforts 
throughout the first decade of the 21st century to enact a range of restrictive laws that 
might persuade immigrants to return home, instead of seeking citizenship—an 
approach immigration opponents referred to as “attrition through enforcement,” aimed 
at encouraging “self-deportation” (Smith 2013).   
These joint GOP efforts to make voting more difficult and to deter immigrants from 
becoming citizens expressed partisan concerns to hold on to power; but they were more 
than that.  They represented a choice to identify the Republican Party with the concerns 
of those white Americans who for whatever reasons felt threatened by the rising 
numbers and political power of non-white voters.  This choice was not inevitable. 
President George W. Bush, like Ronald Reagan before him, favored comprehensive 
immigration reform in part because he believed Republicans could and should compete 
successfully for Latino votes. But Bush failed to persuade the increasingly powerful 
right wing of his party of the value of such a strategy.  Instead, Republican efforts 
perceived as hostile to non-whites, including restrictive voting laws and anti-immigrant 
initiatives, continued to mount through the 2000s, and they expanded further after the 
election of Barack Obama.  Keith Bentele and Erin O’Brien have recently documented 
the rising trend of bills proposed in virtually every state to pose new barriers to voting 
after 2006, as well as the rising number that were enacted from 2010 on (Bentele and 
O’Brien 2013, 1088-1090).  They contend that “the Republican party has engaged in 
strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting 
electoral fortunes, and an internal rightward ideological drift” that has been “heavily 
shaped by racial considerations” (1089).  Specifically, they find such legislative 
initiatives occurring and succeeding more often “where African-Americans and poor 
people vote more frequently, and there are larger numbers of non-citizens” (1098, 1102, 
italics in original).  Again, though these efforts were stalled by various state judicial 
decisions up through 2012, they instantly accelerated after the Supreme Court’s Shelby 
County decision (Brennan Center http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-
2013-voting-laws-roundup).19   Recent political science research also indicates that not 
only are Democrats right to think that restrictive voter laws take “aim along racial lines 
with strategic partisan intent,” they have racial consequences (Bentele and O’Brien 
2013, 1104).  Rachael Cobb and her colleagues find that when voter ID laws are 
implemented, African American and Latino voters are asked for IDs at significantly 
higher rate than white voters (Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012, 2).20 
                                                           
19 Myrna Perez and Vishal Agraharkar If Section 5 Fails: New Voting Implications.   
Brennan Center for Justice, NYU Law School, p2. . 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/147170166/If-Section-5-Falls-New-Voting-Implications 
20 The aim of the Cobb et al study is to determine whether in fact voter ID laws can be 
administered in race neutral ways. Methodologically they strove to design their study 
and to test the data in ways that avoided biases – dealing with such problems as non-
response and the likelihood of clustering by voting location of ID requests. A sensitivity 
analysis was designed to take account of which voters under federal or state law are 
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GOP support for restricting voting laws was not inevitable.  Many expected that the 
Republicans would change course after Obama was re-elected in 2012 with a larger 
share of the Latino and Asian-American votes than in 2008 (and only a slightly smaller 
share of the African American vote).  At first, many GOP leaders seemed to agree.  The 
Republican National Committee’s post-election “Growth and Opportunity” internal 
review commission argued that in light of the nation’s “demographic changes”, unless 
the Republicans begin to strengthen their appeal to Latinos, in part by revising their 
positions on immigration, “we will lose future elections.”21  This proposition fits with 
the arguments of scholars such as Hochschild, Weaver and Burch, who anticipate 
transformations point to the likely emergence of a ‘new racial order’ in American 
politics to accommodatereflecting the growing diversity of its population across race, 
ethnicity and income, driven by long term immigration trends and the liberalizing 
effects of civil rights reforms. Certainly in respect to immigrants the historical pattern of 
initial hostility has been replaced with acceptance as the new members earned their 
‘whiteness’ (Roediger  2005). Even if no longer relying upon such ideologies the modern 
scenario of immigrants as sources of tranformation makes hypothetical sense. 
But soon, as journalists including Ronald Brownstein and Thomas Edsall have reported, 
over the spring and summer of 2013, for many other Republicans, “the sense of 
demographic urgency…palpably dissipated.”22  A number of conservative analysts, 
especially Sean Trende, a writer for RealClearPolitics who has sometimes been 
employed as a GOP strategist, contended that it is a viable strategy for Republicans to 
win in 2014 and 2016, and perhaps beyond, by increasing turnout and winning still 
larger margins of support from white voters, especially “downscale, Northern, rural 
whites.”  Trende has contended that GOP support among whites can realistically reach 
as high as 70%, which with high turnout would be enough to produce victories despite 
Democrats winning over 70% of Latino and Asian voters and well over 90% of black 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
legally required to provide an ID.  The study used the jurisdiction of the City of Boston in 
the 2008 election, when they expected that “voter ID laws were unlikely to pose issues 
of racial difference” (3).  Their findings are alarming. Despite their acknowledgment of 
methodological impediments to eliminating all sources of bias in their study, the 
authors report “strong evidence that Hispanic and black voters were asked for IDs at 
higher rates than similarly situated white voters” (3). Nor do they see any easy remedy 
to the input of discretion employed by poll workers: “to the extent that one 
hypothesizes, as we do, that our results may be due to unconscious assumptions on the 
part of poll workers paid less than minimum wage to work 15-hour days” their evidence 
suggests “such assumption may resist remediation via simple training programs” (3). 
This last point suggests that merely training poll workers in neutral and impartial law 
administration will not overcome the prejudices the researchers found in practice. 
21 Cited in Ronald Brownstein, “Republicans Can’t Win With White Voters Alone,” The 
Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/print/2013/098/repulbicans-cant-win-
with-white-voters-alone. 
22 Ibid.; Thomas B. Edsall, “Can Republicans Paint the White House Red?”, New York 
Times Opinionator, August 28, 2013. 
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voters. He doubts that high African American, Latino, and Asian American voter turnout 
will continue when Barack Obama is not on the ballot.23   
Other analysts have vigorously debated the realism of Trende’s estimates, but his 
arguments have effectively been reinforced by other Republican strategists and many 
political scientists who contend that for a number of reasons, Republicans have good 
chances to win in the next two elections, perhaps recapturing full control of Congress 
and the Presidency.  Some Republicans believe that their efforts to restrict voting, 
especially voting by poorer and non-white Americans, through Voter ID laws and 
related initiatives that have exploded since the Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of 
the Voting Rights Act make their prospects all the more viable.  Even apart from the 
impact of those efforts, Harvard political scientist Steve Ansolabehere has estimated 
Republicans’ chances to win the White House in 2016 as better than 50-50, since 
Americans rarely award the presidency to the same party three elections in a row--, 
though others contend that the GOP must break from the Tea Party in order to produce 
that victory.24   
The pertinent point here is not who is right or wrong in these political analyses of likely 
future voting trends.  It is that the upshot of these debates has been to strengthen 
Republicans and conservatives in the belief that they do not need to modify their 
positions to appeal to non-white voters in order to be politically successful in the years 
ahead.  
And they need not, fundamentally, because they believe they can further improve their 
already strong position among white voters, who have voted against every Democratic 
presidential candidate, albeit sometimes narrowly, since Lyndon Johnson in 1964.   
There can be little doubt that their strategy depends on the belief that many white 
Americans believe that contemporary America is in danger of a catastrophic fall from 
the far better America of the past, one in which whites held hegemonic power.  
In so arguing, we should clarify that Trende did not argue Republicans should make 
white racial appeals.  He urged adoption of “economic populist” positions, even at the 
risk of alienating the GOP’s big business supporters.  And in characterizing vote 
suppression efforts as well as “white voter” electoral strategies as part of the “last 
stand” of America’s historical systems of white power, we do not mean to suggest that 
proponents of these approaches embrace traditional white supremacist ideologies.  
Many, probably most, are simply partisans seeking to gain power. 
                                                           
23 Ibid. 
24 Edsall, ibid. 
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The fact remains, however, that they are seeking power by identifying their party with 
the preferences of white voters.25  Most of those voters do not support any strong 
measures to ameliorate America’s racial inequalities, the patterns of white’s relatively 
advantaged status that can be found in most of the main arenas of American life.  They 
prefer to see the world they see as traditional and right preserved, with their traditional 
relative advantages left intact.  Although those advantages can be forfeited by modern 
individual whites who act improvidently, they are available to whites more than blacks 
largely as legacies of the economic, educational, political and social privileging of whites 
that American white supremacists established in the not so distant past.  When 
Republicans seek to suppress the votes of non-whites who generally support policies 
that would work against preserving those advantages, and instead court the votes of 
whites who generally support policies that sustain privilege, then in effect if not in 
conscious intent, they are seeking to preserve much of what survives of the older white 
supremacist institutional ordering of America.26 
This preservation effort fits with historical differences in political attitudes expressed in 
contemporary America.  In a study of attitudes amongst whites living in Southern 
counties which had high shares of slave populations at the time of the Civil War, three 
researchers find that voters there now evince more conservative attitudes than in other 
counties. Using statistical controls and analysis, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 
(forthcoming) find that in these slave heavy legacy counties whites’ hostility to such 
egalitarian measures as affirmative action is high and they find greater prevalence of 
expressed racial resentment toward African Americans. Testing various explanations 
for this pattern the authors demonstrate how tenacious historically formed racial 
attitudes (privileged in instituions) are in these counties and how they are passed on 
intergenerationally, 
                                                           
25 As some political columnists seem to recognize:  John Harwood, “Behind the Roar of 
Political Debates, Whispers of Race Persist,” New York Times  31 October 2013; and see 
Paul Krugman “A War on the Poor,” New York Times 1 November 2013. 
26 The notion that many whites find it difficult to support transformations in their 
entrenched privileges is supported by a range of evidence beyond the straightforward 
survey data showing that whites are less favorable to race conscious policies than non-
whites.  In a study of attitudes amongst whites living in Southern counties that had high 
shares of slave populations at the time of the Civil War, three researchers find that 
voters there now evince more conservative attitudes than in other counties.  Using 
statistical controls and analysis, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (forthcoming) find that in 
these slave heavy legacy counties, whites’ hostility to such egalitarian measures as 
affirmative action is high, and they find greater prevalence of expressed racial 
resentment toward African Americans. Testing various explanations for this pattern, the 
authors demonstrate how tenacious historically formed racial attitudes (privileged in 
institutions) are in these counties and how they are passed on intergenerationally., 
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3. The Prospects for America’s Racial and Political Future. 
As we have already noted, preservers of the old racial ordering of Americathey face 
substantial obstacles in maintaining it in the 21st centurydoing so.  Indeed, we do not 
believe in the long run they can prevail.  Not only is the Justice Department seeking to 
use the VRA’s section 2 to “bail in” jurisdictions, including Texas, by showing that they 
are seeking to abridge voting rights on account of race or color. In many states, a variety 
of the civil rights advocacy and litigation groups active in the race conscious policy 
alliance are challenging voter ID laws and other restrictive initiatives, with some signal 
successes.  A federal judge invoked the VRA’s Section 3 to reinstate oversight of voting 
practices in Mobile Alabama; another invalidated Pennsylvania’s ID law for burdening 
voting rights without any evidence that the law aided accurate voting; and in Wisconsin, 
litigants are challenging the state’s voter ID law for racially discriminatory effects.27  
And as noted, bi-partisan sponsors in Congress are seeking to take up the Court’s 
invitation to amend the Voting Rights Act, including a new coverage formula.  It is not 
clear whether the U.S. Supreme Court will uphold the lower court rulings against vote 
restriction initiatives, just as it is not clear whether any legislative action on the VRA 
will occur.  It is only clear that this crucial battleground for political power, and the 
propriety of policies designed to aid non-white Americans against traditional forms of 
white privilege, will continue to be a scene of intense contests.28 And importantly while 
our stress has been upon African American voters, a recent study draws attention to the 
barriers facing many American Indians to exercising their vote.  Schroedel 
(forthcoming) argues that blocs of Native American voters have been crucial to the 
success of Democrats on numerous occasions in certain Western state districts and 
senate races, and that these same constituencies have seen dramatic rises in voter 
suppression measures and initiatives.  In fact, Schroedel finds that Native American 
                                                           
27 For stories detailing these efforts, see 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/v/voter_registration_a
nd_requirements/index.html 
28 While our stress has been upon African American voters, a recent study draws 
attention to the barriers facing many American Indians to exercising their vote, often in 
jurisdictions where they can make a difference.  Schroedel (forthcoming) argues that 
blocs of Native American voters have been crucial to the success of Democrats on 
numerous occasions in certain Western state districts and senate races, and that these 
same constituencies have experienced dramatic rises in voter suppression measures 
and initiatives.  Schroedel finds that Native American voters’ challenges remain of a 
“first generation” type – basic obstructions to the act of voting – as much as “second 
generation” barriers of the sort voter suppression laws symbolize. Examples of the 
latter are new state laws proscribing tribal identification as acceptable forms of ID, the 
absence of street addresses and utility bills on reservations which are often required as 
sources of identification, and the issuing of provisional ballot papers which are accepted 
as legal only on return of the voter with a requisite form of identification.  As in the 
application and justification of stringent voter ID laws elsewhere in the country the 
claim that voter fraud needs tackling is not supported by evidence of widespread fraud 
or voter impersonation (Schroedel forthcoming: 41-42).  
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voters’ challenges remain of a first generation type – basic obstructions to the act of 
voting – as much as second generation barriers of the sort voter suppression laws 
symbolize. Examples of the latter are new state laws proscribing tribal identification as 
acceptable forms of ID, the absence of street addresses and utility bills on reservations 
which are often required as sources of identification, and the issuing of provisional 
ballot papers which are accepted as legal only on return of the voter with a requisite 
form of identification.  As in the application and justification of stringent voter ID laws  
elsewhere in the country the claim that voter fraud needs tackling is not supported by 
evidence of widespread fraud or voter impersonation (Schroedel forthcoming: 41-42,  
[WE can add more details here perhaps]Piven, Minnete and Groarke provide a 
comprehensive typology of the current methods of voters’ suppression or what they call 
‘keeping the voters down’ including misinformation campaigns, ‘caging’ and challenging 
voters, and manipulation of registration records and lists (2009: 167-186). 
We think it doubtful, however, that in the long run, efforts at vote suppression can 
successfully prevent the growing numbers of non-white Americans from gaining voting 
power more proportionate with their percentages of the national population.  Unless 
current voting patterns are sharply altered, these trends probably mean that the 
Republicans will have great difficulty winning presidential elections by 2020.  But 
political scientists and GOP strategists are right to argue that they have real prospects of 
success in 2016, and that they have the potential to control congressional and state 
districts gerrymandered in their favourfavor for years after that.  
These facts mean that, though it is likely that current conservative efforts to restrict 
voting rights in ways that disproportionately affect non-whites, like the accompanying 
efforts to restrict disproportionately non-white immigration, will ultimately prove to be 
the “last stand” of efforts to preserve American institutions and practices ordered in 
ways that have long most advantaged whites, the near term forecast is for stormy 
weather indeed.  Americans face battles over voting rights in their electoral campaigns, 
in their legislatures, in their law enforcement agencies’ operations, and in their courts 
that will be costly and time-consuming.  In some instances they  willmay well throw the 
results of elections into doubt, delaying much of the work of the affected governments.  
Only if most Republicans and conservatives decide these are fights they don’t want to 
have or can’t win will these outcomes be avoided.  Only then will America, in regard to 
voting rights, cease to be a “house divided.”  In the poignant words of Langston Hughes 
wrote, that remains an America that “never has been yet--and yet must be.”29  
 
Acknowledgments: Our thanks to Gabriel Nathans for research assistance, and to 
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29 Langston Hughes, “Let America Be America Again,” 
http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15609. 
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